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1. Introduction 
In 2014 Chinese leaders and state energy regulators announced an ambitious plan to help alleviate rural 
poverty through deploying distributed solar photovoltaic (PV) systems in poor areas. The initiative, 
which is positioned as an integral component of China’s political campaign to eradicate poverty by 2020, 
aims to add over 10 GW capacity and benefit more than two million households from around 35,000 
villages across the country by 2020. The policy aims to generate additional annual income of over 3,000 
RMB for each household, mainly through rooftop and small-scale solar systems.  
From an environmental perspective, the deployment of solar PV can help to mitigate the worst effects 
of climate change and air pollution by avoiding the greenhouse gases and other pollutants emitted by 
coal burning, which still make up the largest share of China’s energy mix. China’s central government 
has in recent years supported a shift away from fossil fuels for these reasons, as well as moving the 
country towards a position of technology leadership and restructuring domestic industries towards 
services, innovation and higher value production.  
Although this Working Paper focuses on a specific Chinese policy approach, it hopes to inform 
perspectives on energy access and development in other contexts. Much of this literature is dominated 
by engineering and economics, a 'hardware financing' approach, with less attention to the socio-cultural 
or political dimensions of these questions (Watson et al. 2012; Ockwell and Byrne 2016; Newell and 
Bulkeley 2016). Literature informed by the field of socio-technical transitions (Ulsrud et al. 2015; Tyfield 
et al. 2015; Ahlborg and Sjöstedt 2015; Ockwell and Byrne 2016; Rolffs et al. 2015; Baker et al. 2014; 
Power et al. 2016; Newell and Mulvaney 2013; Newell and Phillips 2016) has brought greater socio-
cultural and evolutionary dimensions to the context of energy transitions, and more recent studies also 
call for greater attention to political dimensions of energy transitions (for example Meadowcroft 2011; 
Geels 2014; Kern 2011; Scrase and Smith 2009). 
In this paper, we trace the emergence and implementation of the solar energy for poverty alleviation 
programme (SEPAP) by identifying its social, political and economic rationales through a comprehensive 
analysis of policy documents. Then, through a case study in a county in Qinghai province, one of the 
more isolated and underdeveloped regions of western China, this paper aims to identify the main 
challenges for implementing SEPAP and benefitting rural residents in China and to suggest some 
tentative wider conclusions regarding the dynamics of energy and development policy in China, 
particularly in the northwest and Tibetan Plateau.   
The paper is divided into four sections. First, it provides a historical review of rural electrification, 
poverty alleviation, and the development of the solar energy industry in China. This illustrates that the 
current development stage of the solar energy industry; the high degree of rural electrification; and the 
growing income gap between rural and urban populations are the three major factors driving the SEPAP 
initiative since 2014. Second, it focuses on existing policies around SEPAP by identifying major policy 
objectives, institutional development, and implementation routes. It also provides a discourse analysis 
of policy documents to illustrate the key actors and their interests in promoting this initiative.  
Third, it presents a case study of one of the counties where SEPAP has been implemented in Qinghai 
Province to investigate the implementation process on the ground. The case study involved brief but 
intensive field investigation and semi-structured interviews with local stakeholders in October and 
November 2016. Based on the findings of the policy analysis and case study, the final section discusses 
the theoretical and practical implications of SEPAP, with particular focus on the role of solar energy in 
the future energy landscape in rural China, in terms of the energy ladder for rural households and 
potential for clean energy transition.   
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2. Research Context 
To understand the drivers and the implications of SEPAP, it is worth understanding three major contexts: 
the persistence of rural poverty in China, in the context of a political push for poverty alleviation; the 
overcapacity and curtailment in China’s solar energy industry, and consequent need to encourage 
distributed solar PV installation; and the current situation for rural electrification, where previous 
technological preferences, particularly small hydro, are no longer viable.  
2.1 The Rural-Urban Income Gap  
Since initiating market reforms in 1978, China experienced unprecedented economic and social 
development, with GDP growth averaging nearly ten per cent a year over the past three decades. Along 
with this rapid economic growth came a dramatic increase in household incomes in both rural and urban 
areas, which lifted more than 800 million people out of poverty (World Bank 2017).   
However, incomes in rural areas rose far slower than in urban areas. The average per capita disposable 
income in urban areas increased from 343 RMB in 1978 to 31,195 RMB in 2015, whereas in rural areas, 
this figure rose from 134 RMB to 11,422 RMB (National Bureau of Statistics 2016). Throughout the 
economic reform era, the urban-rural income ratio in China was around 3:1, much higher than the 
international average of 1.5:1 to 1.6:1 (Knight and Song 1999), even before non-monetary variances in 
education, medical care, and other social welfare gaps between rural and social areas are taken into 
account.  
The rural-urban income gap is exacerbated by unbalanced economic development between provinces. 
China’s less developed western regions have a higher rural-urban income gap, with some provinces 
reaching a 4: 1 ratio (Xinhua News Agency, 2010). According to China’s current poverty standard (annual 
net per capita income of 2,300 RMB in 2010 prices), there were currently 56.30 million poor in rural 
areas in 2015 (State Council, 2015). The majority this population live in western inland provinces.  
Since President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, poverty alleviation has been elevated to be amongst 
the highest development priorities in China. Xi has paid many visits to the poorest townships and villages 
across China and thus signalled a commitment to combat poverty. As a consequence several crucial 
policy documents have been issued since 2013, echoing this determination to tackle widening inequality 
and income gap (State Council 2013). In 2014, the Government announced that each year on 17 October 
'Poverty Alleviation Day' would be marked to coincide with the United Nations International Day for the 
Eradication of Poverty. Before Poverty Alleviation Day in 2015 Xi formally announced the goal of 
eradicating poverty completely in China by 2020 (Xinhua News Agency, 2015).  
However, addressing the remaining population under the poverty line is a difficult 'last mile problem'.  
As the case study below illustrates, the majority of this population is located in the most remote and 
isolated areas of China. Data on the numbers of these households and their income are often outdated 
and incomplete. As discussed further below, a section of this population is also nomadic and therefore 
hard to locate and monitor statistically. Local environmental and geographic conditions can make it 
difficult to improve significantly local livelihoods in a sustainable manner, beyond government subsidies 
and temporary material assistance.  
Recent poverty alleviation programmes in China are typically designed with two major criteria: the so-
called 'precision' (精准 jingzhun), and the 'industrial' (产业 chanye) requirements. The former 
emphasises government subsidies and assistance spent on the basis of precise and comprehensive data, 
so that specific households or villages can be targeted and helped. The latter, 'industrial', approach 
emphasises the improvement of industrial or productive capabilities of underdeveloped localities by 
3 
 
developing creative and innovative industrial facilities, so that these households and villages can 
become self-sustaining in the long run. SEPAP emerged as an example of this combined approach.     
2.2 China’s Solar Energy at a Crossroads 
The second major driver for SEPAP emerges from the solar energy industry itself. China’s solar PV sector 
experienced dramatic growth over the past decade. Initially, the industry was largely export oriented, 
with the dominant share of solar panels produced for overseas markets in Europe, particularly Germany 
and Spain (Zhang et al 2014). However, declining orders in the wake of the financial crisis, combined 
with trade disputes in the European Union (EU) and United States (US) in 2008 over alleged Chinese 
'dumping' of cheap PV panels, and a fall in the price of polysilicon which hit companies that had hoarded 
the material, led some Chinese solar manufacturers to the brink of collapse (Urban et al. 2016). 
China’s Central Government therefore focused on opening the domestic solar energy market as a rescue 
strategy for the manufacturing sector. Strong supportive measures, such as a favourable feed-in-tariff 
(FIT), government pilots, subsidy programmes and concessional bidding projects were designed and 
implemented in a top-down manner to expand solar power generation capacity (Chen and Lees 2016). 
In addition, the development of solar energy was welcomed by many local governments and large 
energy utilities and manufacturing corporations as a new site for market opportunities and local 
economic development (Harrison and Kostka 2013; Shen 2016). Multiple interests, therefore, aligned in 
promoting this 'strategically important' industry (State Council, 2013b). 
The rescue plan was successful (see Figure 2.1). By 2013, China had become the world's leading market 
for solar energy producers; by the end of 2015 it had reached a total installed capacity of more than 
43.18 GW (National Energy Administration 2016a). Over 15 GW was installed in 2015 alone, or more 
than a quarter of the total installation of solar capacity around the globe that year (International Energy 
Agency 2016a). Production capacity was boosted even further. In fact, the domestic installation of 15 
GW only consumed an estimated one-third of China’s total manufacturing capacity (National Energy 
Administration 2016a). There is, therefore, a persistent over-capacity issue in the solar energy industry. 
Figure 2.1 Development of China’s Solar Energy Sector, 2008 to 2015 (MW) 
 
Source: National Energy Administration and China Photovoltaic Industry Association 
 
Furthermore, the rapid expansion of solar installation has outpaced grid connections. Most of this new 
capacity is in poorer western provinces where solar resources are ample, but local energy consumption 
is low. Long-distance transmission of this electricity to demand centres in the east is neither 
economically viable nor technologically practical. As a result, curtailment is rampant (Shen 2016). In 
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production. This rose as high as 39 per cent in Gansu and 52 per cent in Xinjiang over the first six months 
of 2016 (National Energy Administration 2016a; National Energy Administration 2016b).  
The Central Government has adjusted its policies in response to curtailments and declared that 
provinces with severe curtailment problems are no longer allowed to build new solar plants. Instead, 
regulators encourage small-scale, distributed solar systems, where the energy produced can be 
consumed locally (National Energy Administration 2015a). Such distributed systems have long been 
favoured by Chinese regulators and viewed as the best model for the solar energy sector in China.  
In 2014, the National Energy Administration (NEA) announced an ambitious distributed PV target of 7 
GW. However, actual installation lagged at around 26 per cent of this target, mainly because investors 
favour large-scale solar parks, as such capital-intensive investments provide more stable financial 
returns in the long run. This market preference for large-scale projects led policymakers to design 
incentives to promote distributed systems, but with limited success. In 2015, more than 90 per cent of 
China’s newly installed solar capacity was from large scale projects (National Energy Administration, 
2016a) and distributed systems remained far below the government’s expectations. This, therefore, 
provides an important context for SEPAP, which received support from both poverty-alleviation and 
energy-focused officials, who found a compatible strategic vision that could benefit residents while 
helping to absorb overcapacity and increase distributed solar PV generation.  
2.3 Trends in Rural Electrification 
To understand SEPAP, it is not only necessary to consider poverty alleviation targets and solar energy 
development, but also the history of rural electrification to date. In 1949 at the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China, less than 10 per cent of China’s rural population had access to electricity. Since then, 
the Party and Government have attached great political importance to expanding electrification as an 
aspect of rural modernisation.  
This had reached 99.8 per cent by 2013 (Bie and Lin, 2015) and in December 2015, the last 39,800 people 
living without electricity in the most remote counties of Qinghai Province were reportedly connected, 
representing 100 per cent electrification in China (National Energy Administration 2015b). Achieving the 
100 per cent target between 2013 and 2015 apparently cost central and local governments more than 
US$4 billion. The state owned grid and utility companies were the major implementation agencies, but 
given the long distances and high altitudes the project was beyond any plausible commercial viability. 
Renewable energy played an important role in earlier decades of rural electrification. China’s rural 
energy landscape was dominated for a long time by small hydro power (SHP) stations (Huang and Yan 
2009). At the end of 2014, there were over 47,000 SHP stations across China, with an installed capacity 
of 73 GW, or more than 25 per cent of the total hydropower capacity of the country (Bie and Lin 2015; 
China Energy Magazine 2015). Most of these SHPs are located in the central and southwest provinces, 
where hydro resources are abundant (Li et al, 2005), and produce electricity for local communities or 
are interconnected for regional or mini-grid networks. Most of these stations have access to the national 
grid in case peak adjustment is needed. Interestingly, the rapid development of SHP stations since the 
late 1970s was the result of a bottom-up approach, where local governments and power companies 
were given considerable autonomy to plan, invest in, implement and maintain these projects (Bie and 
Lin 2015; Peng and Pan 2006), which were popular not only due to their electricity generation benefits, 
but also for agricultural irrigation, flood control and more.  
However, since 2012 the construction of SHP stations has slowed down as the hydro potential in many 
provinces has been exhausted and it is increasingly difficult to locate new sites for SHP construction. 
The remaining rural areas without electricity tend to have limited hydro resources. As a result, solar PV 
systems have emerged as a leading option to continue rural electrification. Although solar PV has long 
been identified as an economically viable option for remote and isolated communities (Byrne et al. 1998; 
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Byrne et al. 2007), it typically played a minor role in rural energy systems apart from in solar water 
heating systems (Zhang et al. 2009). This perception may be changing, however, as prices fall and 
remote areas see the benefits of reliable energy generation that does not rely on imported fuels (Byrne 
et al. 2007).  
Rising electrification rates also resulted in significant changes to energy consumption patterns in rural 
areas. The proportion of non-commercial energy consumption (mainly biomass sources such as 
firewood, dung or straw) in total rural energy has dropped from 70 per cent in 1979 to 30 per cent in 
2007 (Liu et al. 2013), whereas the consumption of commercial electricity increased enormously, from 
3.1 million tonnes of coal equivalent (Mtce) in 1979 to 101.99 Mtce in 2007. Still, as suggested in Section 
2.1, there is great disparity between provinces and regions not only due to the complex distribution of 
energy sources (both fossil fuels and renewables) but also social and economic factors, with per capita 
consumption of commercial electricity significantly lower in the underdeveloped areas of northwest 
China (Zhang et al. 2009).  
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3. Policy Frameworks  
Although the potential of renewable energy technologies in enhancing rural residents’ energy 
consumption and living standard had been long discussed in academic literature (cf. Byrne et al. 1998: 
Byrne et al. 2007; Wang and Qiu 2009; Zhang and Kumar 2011) the emergence of policy frameworks in 
China that could apply these technologies in rural areas relied on the particular social, economic and 
political constellation described in the preceding sections. The following sections describe and analyse 
the framework that emerged.  
3.1 Policy Design and Institutions 
Two elite decision-making bodies, the NEA and the State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty 
Alleviation and Development (CPAD), initiated and led SEPAP. It also involved the China Renewable 
Energy Engineering Institute (CREEI), which took charge of overall technical design and quality control, 
the two grid monopolies (State Grid and Southern Grid), and two policy banks, China Development Bank 
(CDB) and China Agriculture Development Bank (CADB), which are expected to provide financial support 
for the programme.  
This led to the establishment of a multi-tiered governance structure (see Figure 3.1). From the figure it 
is clear that although SEPAP is co-governed by NEA and CPAD, the decision-making power largely resides 
in the NEA, and in particular its Renewable Energy Department, since most of the implementation 
agencies (grid companies, solar corporations, and policy banks) are either directly or indirectly regulated 
by this department (illustrated by the blue arrows), while CPAD only play a supporting and monitoring 
role, with no administrative authority over the these agencies apart from the local poverty alleviation 
offices (PAOs).  
Figure 3.1 Governance Structure of SEPAP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CREEI State Grid Southern 
Grid 
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3.2 Policy Developments Since 2014 
In 2014 the NEA and CPAD issued two joint policies that kicked off SEPAP. The first policy, in October 
2014, set out the multiple purposes of SEPAP, which included 'reducing poverty, expanding the solar PV 
market, enhancing rural employment and income, and transforming rural lifestyles' (NEA and CPAD 
2014a). Therefore, it should be noted that from the beginning, SEPAP was defined as a programme that 
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near these counties or villages by utilising non-arable land and rooves of greenhouses. The SEPAP would 
be financed by both government subsidies, and corporate donations as an aspect of their corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) activities. 
The second joint policy was released in November 2014, with detailed measures on developing pilot 
SEPAP projects in six provinces (NEA and CPAD 2014b). This policy announced 30 counties in the 
provinces of Ningxia, Anhui, Shanxi, Hebei, Gansu and Qinghai would be appointed as pilot areas for 
SEPAP. Under the policy, each county should compile comprehensive data on its poor households, 
energy supply and consumption, and grid connection quality. Provincial governments should establish 
dedicated teams to work out implementation plans for different counties. Once these plans are 
approved at central government level, they should be carried out by county governments via an open 
bidding process. Financial support comes from provincial governments’ poverty alleviation funds or 
policy banks’ preferential loans. Under the policy, NEA and CPAD should also design a monitoring and 
quality control mechanism to supervise the construction and maintenance of the project activities. 
However, the local pilots are encouraged to identify suitable business models to construct and operate 
these facilities and distribute benefits among stakeholders.  
In March 2015 NEA’s Renewable Energy Department issued guidelines (initially developed by CREEI) for 
pilot provinces and counties to compile SEPAP implementation plans (NEA 2015c). This document 
specified all pilot project should be established by the end of that year, and another three provinces 
were added: Inner Mongolia, Yunnan and Xinjiang. It also prescribed a financial model where 70 per 
cent of household-level projects and 40 per cent of village solar plants (with collective ownership) would 
be supported by government subsidies, with the remainder covered by loans from policy banks and 
corporate investments or donations. It also suggested over 50 per cent of the revenues from village 
solar plants be distributed among poor households in these villages. Additionally, the document set the 
policy goal of guaranteeing an additional annual income of 3,000 RMB per household for more than 20 
years. 
Since Xi Jinping’s December 2015 vow to eradicate poverty in China by 2020, SEPAP was elevated from 
pilot programme to national campaign and received the highest level of political endorsement. In a joint 
official statement of the CPC and State Council, SEPAP is mentioned as a promising option to generate 
income for poor households in rural areas (CPC and State Council 2015). Then in early 2016, Xi paid a 
visit to a pilot SEPAP village in Anhui Province. Subsequently, the programme was expanded to include 
16 provinces, 471 counties and two million households (NDRC 2016). In August 2016 CADB issued a 
dedicated policy regarding the preferential financial arrangement, with up to 10 per cent discount from 
the central bank’s base rate when lending to SEPAP projects. In October NEA announced the first batch 
of approved SEPAP projects in 14 provinces with a total capacity of 5.16 GW (NEA and CPAD 2016), and 
in December the 13th Five Year Plan for the Electricity Sector re-emphasised the importance of SEPAP 
and urged provinces and localities to establish a reliable long-term management scheme for the 
operation of SEPAP projects and benefits distribution among poor households (NEA 2016a). Meanwhile 
NEA also suggested the implementation of SEPAP was a good opportunity to upgrade rural grid 
networks in remote areas (NEA 2016b).   
3.3 Policy Analysis 
Despite the political importance attached to SEPAP, closer examination reveals four particular concerns 
about its design worth considering, even before we consider implementation based on the fieldwork 
below. First, the pilot stage of the programme was very short and lasted less than a year. This gave 
regulators little time to assess the successes and failures of the pilots before it was elevated to a national 
programme – traditionally an essential part of most policy experiments in China (Heilmann 2008a; 
Heilmann 2008b). Second, the idea to combine renewable energy and poverty alleviation is timely, 
ambitious and creative, but its governance structure suggested that energy regulators, rather than 
development officials, took the lead. Energy regulators typically have skills in supply-side management 
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and experience in promoting industrial capacity, for solar panels and large solar plants for example, but 
they possess limited knowledge regarding local contexts, or poverty and development issues, 
particularly at the grassroots, village level.  
Third, are the lack of arrangements for financing and post-construction maintenance. No additional 
budget or funding was allocated from either central or local government. The funds came from existing 
renewable energy subsidies and poverty alleviation funds, which were both already strained, even 
before the introduction of SEPAP. It is unrealistic to assume gigawatt-scale facilities can be built through 
corporate donations alone, and policy banks have shown only cautious support so far for the initiative, 
with a very marginal discount rate for SEPAP projects. Even if SEPAP projects can be constructed, it is 
questionable how solar projects will be maintained for over 20 years, as local counties and villages are 
not technologically capable of running plants by themselves and maintenance costs can run high 
particularly in these remote areas.  
Fourth, there is no monitoring system in place to supervise the distribution of benefits to poor 
households. The murky reality of village governance in China means this represents a serious challenge 
for the implementation and accountability of SEPAP particularly where it relates to the actual income 
increase for villagers. A 'precision' strategy here may be helpful for the central government to identify 
the poorest households, but it would do little to protect them if the local bureaucracy wish to take the 
lion’s share of the profits generated from SEPAP projects.  It is with these concerns from the policy 
review that we started our field study in one of the pilot SEPAP counties in Qinghai Province, as 
illustrated in the case study below.  
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4. Case Study of Guinan County in Qinghai Province 
To further explore the dynamics of policy implementation and the relationship between solar PV and 
(energy) poverty, two of the co-authors (Sam Geall and Gongbu Zeren) conducted scoping fieldwork in 
Guinan County, Qinghai Province, on the Tibetan Plateau in north-western China, which is situated in 
Hainan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, south of Qinghai Lake (also known as Kokonor).  
4.1 Introducing Qinghai and Guinan  
Figure 4.1 Qinghai Province  
 
Source: Wikimedia 
Qinghai (Figure 4.1) is one of China’s poorer provinces, with an average gross national product per capita 
of 41,252 RMB, 17.5 per cent less than the national average, and accounting for only 0.3 per cent of the 
country’s overall economy (Climatescope 2015) and is a net electricity exporter, accounting for four per 
cent of the country’s electricity generation (Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 2012). The province 
also has a somewhat unusual energy profile compared to the rest of the country: coal accounted for 
only 13 per cent of installed capacity by year-end 2014, and in terms of generation, 68 per cent of the 
total 60TWh power produced in Qinghai came from large hydropower. The balance was supplied by 
other renewables (10.5 per cent) and coal (21 per cent) (Climatescope 2015).  
Figure 4.2 Guinan County, Qinghai Province 
 
Source: Zhang et al. 2016 
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Guinan County (Figure 4.2) has been designated a pilot county for the implementation of SEPAP. It is 
also an interesting choice of fieldsite given its environment and climate context and the history of solar 
PV use in the region, including off-grid small-scale solar, as well as large, utility-scale installations. 
From a global perspective, the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau (known henceforth as the Tibetan Plateau) is 
critically important. Glaciers are in retreat in the Himalayas, where the rise in mean temperature has 
been higher than the global average (Matthew 2013) and the rate of glacial retreat has accelerated in 
the past century (National Research Council 2012). The plateau – sometimes referred to as the 'Third 
Pole' as it contains the largest store of fresh water outside the two polar regions – has a very significant 
influence on the region’s climate, including its monsoons.  
The region is also known as the 'Headwaters of Asia', as almost all of Asia’s major rivers rise on the 
Plateau, providing water for some 1.3 billion people (Bandyopadhyay 2013). In Qinghai Province, these 
include the Yellow, Mekong and Yangtze Rivers. Other rivers rising on the Plateau include the 
Brahmaputra, the Ganges, the Indus, the Irrawaddy and Salween Rivers. Changes in water availability in 
the Himalayas due to climate change, as suggested in one fairly conservative forecast, could create 
population displacement, losses in agricultural harvests, damage to fisheries, disease outbreaks or 
regional conflict (National Research Council 2012).  
The environmental situation is further complicated by the water-engineering and ostensibly low-carbon 
large-scale hydroelectric projects planned by countries on these rivers, including upstream nation China 
(Pomeranz 2013; Chellaney 2011), which on some watersheds are potentially complicated by the lack 
of water-sharing agreements. In the case of Hainan Prefecture, there are large hydroelectric dams built 
and under construction near the source of the Yellow River, the entirety of which runs through China. 
The Longyangxia dam, in neighbouring Gonghe County, has an installed capacity of 1280 MW and also 
boasts the world’s first commercial operation of a large-scale solar PV-hydro hybrid system, which is 
also the world’s largest solar PV installation, an 850-MW PV plant with hydropower helping to 'smooth 
the output curve' of the solar-generated electricity, which is intermittent due to cloud cover and time 
of day (Rogner 2015).  
Around 60 per cent of the Tibetan Plateau’s 2.5 million square kilometres (Qiu 2016) – and around 41 
per cent of China’s land (Foggin 2012) – are grasslands. These landscapes are traditionally home to 
nomadic pastoralists. China has some 260 pastoral counties, which accommodate about 39 million 
people (Miller 2002), many of these (although not all) in parts of the Tibetan Plateau. One estimate puts 
China’s population of herders and agro-herders at 17 million (Li et al. 2014).  
Guinan county is one such pastoral county, and 60 per cent of its area is rangeland (Feng et al. 2008). 
The county’s land includes alpine steppes and alpine desert pastures that herders used for different 
seasonal pastures, as well as large areas of desert, some agricultural land and a small urban 
concentration, in the form of the county seat. It has a semi-arid climate, meaning droughts are major 
disasters that herders face. Herders mainly keep sheep while they also own some yaks. It has an average 
temperate of 4°C and mean elevation of 3,100m above sea level (Feng et al. 2008). The sustainability of 
its rangelands in the context of a warming climate and environmental degradation have become a 
critical concern for herders and others here, much as it has elsewhere in Qinghai and across China.  
The prominent Chinese scholar, Hu Angang writes approvingly of Qinghai’s political ambition to become 
an 'ecological province', noting that, 'Qinghai faces basic contradictions with respect to its development: 
it needs to develop its economy and reduce poverty, but it also has to implement environmental 
protection and instigate ecological construction' (Hu Angang 2017: 144). Of six, separate in-depth, semi-
structured interviews with herders selected through convenience sampling in nomadic areas of Guinan 
county, all said they had seen similar negative changes in local climate and environment over their 
lifetime. One, an elderly former village headman (whose account was typical of those we heard), told 
us that compared to conditions during his youth, average temperatures in the region in summer and 
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winter had risen and become more extreme; that precipitation has reduced and the rains come later in 
the year than previously; that the grasslands had suffered serious degradation, with increasing 
infestations of pika, a small mammal related to rabbits and hares, and vegetation cover decreasing; and 
springs and other water resources were drying up. 
The causes of this degradation, however, are disputed. Some suggest the warming trend on the Tibetan 
Plateau has contributed to worsening desertification in these grassland areas, and suggest that grazing 
can help mitigate the negative effects of warming on rangeland quality. (Klein et al. 2007). Others 
suggest human activity, including over-grazing, are the primary drivers of grassland degradation (Feng 
et al. 2008). This latter thesis is the basis of the  Chinese Government’s 'ecological construction' policies, 
which encourage various strategies, including settlement of herders, grazing bans, rotational grazing 
systems and 'retiring livestock to restore the grasslands' programmes as part of environmental 
restoration and climate-change adaptation efforts (State Council of PRC 2008). Such programmes have 
been widely adopted, and, as some would diagnose it, have in turn had a further negative effect on the 
grassland ecosystem. For example, one study (Fan et al. 2014) concluded that nomad resettlement is 
'poorly adapted to local ecosystem characteristics', and may therefore have negative impacts at larger 
scales. 
The impacts of herder settlement policies are hotly debated, with some studies suggesting they may 
help nomads adopt new livelihoods and increase their incomes, with others arguing that settlement – 
and particularly, resettlement to cities – means that herders have no practical ways of maintaining 
pastoral ways of life (Li et al. 2014). The range of proposed policies and government approaches to 
herder settlement are wide and complex. In some cases, subsidies are provided for housing near winter 
pastures, as well as livelihood support, but herding is not directly restricted. In other cases, nomads are 
encouraged to move to the local township, rather than resettled to newly built homes.  
In Guinan County there were examples of all these approaches: there was at least one settlement 
project, but also many households that had received livelihood subsidies (one household told us they 
received 1,800 RMB annually in payments-for-ecosystems-services subsidies, for example) or that had 
built new winter homes with some government support. Others had moved to the township. The leader 
of one of five groups that made up a village of 413 households in Guinan County, and therefore the de 
facto headman for 80 households, of whom 35 were still working as herders under a hybridised, 
informally collectivised system, said that when his two children went to school he faced a labour 
shortage in herding, and thus decided to move to the township, nearer to the school, selling his livestock 
and starting a handicrafts business – a fairly typical situation.  
4.2 Solar PV in Qinghai 
The Tibetan Plateau emerged over the past two decades as something of a test-bed for the use of solar 
energy in China. The region has some of world’s best solar energy resources. There is wide geographical 
distribution, little cloud cover, with, on average, 275 to 330 days each year with more than six hours of 
sunshine, high radiant intensity and high altitude (Luo and Zhang 2012). By the end of 2015, Qinghai 
Province reportedly had an installed capacity of 5.6 GW of ground-mounted solar PV and an additional 
2.8 MW of distributed PV (ChinaPower.com 2016). 
At first, solar PV in China was developed and deployed principally for lighting and other off-grid products 
to expand energy access for traditionally nomadic populations on the plateau, for whom electricity 
would not previously have been available. In 1996 the Central Government introduced the Brightness 
Programme, which targeted off-grid communities across western China. From 2002 to 2007, the 
centrally planned Renewable Energy Development Project (REDP) sold more than 400,000 solar home 
systems benefiting two million individuals in north-western China (Sovacool 2012) including nomads in 
need of a portable, safe and sustainable energy supply.  
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Starting in 2009, as the burgeoning solar PV manufacturing industry struggled to stimulate the domestic 
distributed PV market, the Chinese Government promoted the distributed-PV-focused Golden Sun 
Programme as part of development on the Tibetan plateau. According to state media (CCTV 2013), some 
93 'photovoltaic power stations' and 109,811 solar home systems were installed in Qinghai Province 
alone through that programme.  
Herders in Guinan described two major poverty alleviation programmes that had distributed off-grid 
solar PV systems there since 2014. One purportedly came as a package, a white tent, a solar PV panel 
and solar cooker; the other, simply a solar PV panel. A certain quota of each were given to villages. They 
were then distributed according to a locally determined combination of lottery and need. The former 
package was intended for the poorest families. However, clearly other policies and previous generations 
of policy, as well as civil-society projects (these and Chinese Government projects were often difficult 
to distinguish, from the perspective of the aid recipients) had donated other solar PV products, including 
solar PV panels with lithium-ion batteries, for purposes including lighting and churning yak milk into 
butter. Some herders had also bought solar PV systems on the open market, and would often have more 
than one solar product, some bought and some donated.  
Figure 4.3 Solar Cooker Seen Outside Herders’ Winter Home in Guinan County 
 
  Source: Sam Geall 
Development organisations, NGOs and philanthropists have long funded numerous off-grid solar energy 
projects on the Plateau. These have included solar cooker distribution programmes (Figure 4.3), which 
have the advantage of avoiding harmful indoor air pollution from biomass smoke. So closely associated 
have these particular off-grid solar products become with Tibetan livelihoods, in fact, that the Chinese 
artist Ai Weiwei used an array of solar cookers in an installation shown at the site of California’s Alcatraz 
prison in 2014, widely seen as referring to Tibet and its contested political status. Other programmes 
have supported the installation of solar water heaters. However, in Guinan county we only observed 
these installed in the urbanised county seat. None of the herders we interviewed had solar water 
heaters and local herders and headmen told us that this was true across the whole area. 
China’s PV industry has, in general, seen a shift from locally focused development initiatives to expand 
off-grid energy access in China towards greater top-level ambitions to expand the domestic installation 
of utility-scale grid-connected solar PV. Recent approaches to solar energy in Qinghai, therefore, put 
emphasis on the development of large-scale, ground-mounted solar farms in the country’s west, 
connected to demand centres in the urbanised eastern seaboard via ultra-high-voltage transmission 
lines built by State Grid (Mathews and Hao 2016) (see Figure 4.4). In this dominant narrative, China’s 
west is cast as desert for exploitation (and implicitly, modernisation) through centralised and large-scale 
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solar developments, analogous to the other major renewable energy projects in the region, such as wind 
power farms and large-scale hydropower projects.  
Figure 4.4 State Grid Office Near Qinghai Lake 
 
  Source: Sam Geall 
One herder referred to this memorably in an interview with us as the 'west-to-east energy diversion' 
(xidiandongdiao), deliberately echoing the enormous water engineering programme known as the 
'south-to-north water diversion' (nanshuibeidiao). Importantly, in the case of development in Qinghai 
Province, this came at the same time as a general push towards encouraging sedentarised livelihoods 
with grid-connected homes. Therefore, we would expect in general a decrease in uptake of off-grid solar 
(seen for example in Sovacool 2012: 41).  
Figure 4.5 10 MW Solar Power Plant in Guinan County 
 
  Source: Sam Geall 
Indeed, on the grasslands of Guinan county, at the end of a dirt track next to the winter pasture – on 
380 mu (around 25 hectares) of land owned by a local ethnically Han village, which had apparently not 
been used recently for herding, and immediately abutted a large desert – sat a newly built 10-MW solar 
farm, which was not yet connected to the grid (see Figure 4.5). There was a small, half-built control 
room next to the plant, which was fenced in and had 'no entry' signs. When we arrived, a group of 
around 30 labourers from Henan province were setting fires, burning the boxes the modules had arrived 
in (marked 'Jinko Solar', one of China’s biggest PV producers). One told us the plant had been built by a 
Beijing-based company and that it was intended to export electricity to neighbouring regions and 
provinces via new transmission lines, which could be seen cutting across the pasture. Most significantly, 
she told us that the plant had been built under SEPAP, and that it would not have been built otherwise, 
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given the current unlikelihood of obtaining permission for large grid-connected plants given ongoing 
problems with curtailment.  
It is likely the plant was indeed cleared through SEPAP, since one model of its implementation is that a 
company agrees to donate money and/or a certain number of solar PV modules in exchange for 
permission to build a utility-scale project (Interview with CS 2016)1. A high-level environmental official 
in Beijing, on hearing about the plant, bluntly described it as one of many 'fake' solar plants in China 
(Interview with JF 2016)2, in the sense that it did not constitute a genuine poverty-alleviation or small-
scale project. Another Beijing-based expert at a Chinese government think-tank (Interview with PJ 
2016)3  said that SEPAP had proven impossible to implement as initially intended due to the high 
transaction costs and lack of additional funds, accounting for this type of workaround driven by local 
industry looking for a way to clear a project that would otherwise be rejected due to concerns about 
curtailments.  
4.3 User Practices and Perspectives 
In studying the aspects of solar PV rollout, and electrification more broadly, that may help meet the 
needs of the poor, it is necessary to understand better the energy needs, practices and experiences of 
those users – nomadic pastoralists, in this particular case – that SEPAP and related policies have targeted. 
Most important here, perhaps, is understanding the continued seasonal movement of herders in the 
county, which means that at least in this region of Qinghai, mobile, off-grid energy sources are as 
relevant and necessary for many local people as grid-connected electricity.  
Of the herders we interviewed, all had permanent winter homes with grid-connected electricity. The 
earliest grid connection was in 1986 and the most recent was in 2007. Electricity was used in these 
homes for lighting, television, refrigeration and mobile phone charging. However, many reported that 
this supply still was, or had been until recently, unstable and prone to blackout. Significantly, all also 
spent at least two months a year in summer pasture – and in some cases also for weeks at a time 
collecting cordyceps sinensis (caterpillar fungus) on the grasslands – where they lived in tents and, 
without exception, used solar home systems for uses such as mobile-phone charging, watching 
television, butter churning and lighting (one herder also mentioned using it to power an electric blanket 
on cold nights).  
As is mentioned above, China reports near total or total electricity connectivity across its population via 
the grid (World Bank 2012). However, as the persistence of seasonal movements implies, this should 
not necessarily suggest the end of a need for off-grid solar technologies. Perhaps more significantly, nor 
should it necessarily imply that the current structure of grid-based electricity approaches – including 
through the buildout of utility-scale solar PV in the northwest – benefits the poor and local communities. 
As we found and explain below, some current approaches seem oriented towards the needs of industry 
and urban demand centres, rather than to pastoral and rural communities there.  
Every herder that we interviewed in Guinan, regardless of income or social status, exclusively used 
animal dung for space heating and cooking. As mentioned above, none had running water or a regular 
supply of hot water (though dung could be used for heating water when needed). Many had solar 
cookers, but these were not commonly used. Herders told us they used them on particularly hot days 
in summer, or encouraged older family members to use them, as they required less effort to operate 
and tend than a fire (see Figure 4.3 above). 
                                                          
1 A Beijing-based researcher in the fields of energy and development. 
2 A Beijing-based official in environmental protection. 
3 A Beijing-based researcher at a high-level government think tank, in the fields of energy, climate and development. 
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Asked about the advantages and disadvantages of solar PV, one herder told us the disadvantage was 
that the panels could be bulky and inconvenient to move if you did not own or could not use motorised 
transport. Although this particular herder owned a car, his summer pasture was inaccessible by road, 
meaning his solar panels and batteries needed to be transported by animal. He also noted that if herders 
discarded the batteries after replacement (something that happened around every two years) they 
would pollute the grasslands. However, he said the advantages, that they were convenient for lighting, 
phone charging and watching television in the evenings when herding, far outweighed such drawbacks. 
In this, his opinion was typical. On the whole, herders held very positive opinions about small-scale solar 
PV technology and made frequent use of it during the summer. Additionally, many made use of solar 
PV butter churns all year round (see Figure 4.6).  
Figure 4.6 Solar System Used for Butter Churning All Year Round 
 
  Source: Sam Geall 
Herders’ perspectives and opinions on various aspects of grid electricity infrastructure were more 
complex. A new hydroelectric dam, with an adjoining solar PV plant, was under construction very nearby 
submerging a large area of grassland, and some resented the destruction of what had been autumn 
pasture, even though herders had received compensation (apparently a total of 8,500 RMB). An older 
herder recalled the impact large-scale relocation had in the construction of the Longyangxia dam – built 
on the same upstream Yellow River tributary – in the mid-1980s. 
A big impact was also felt in the construction of new transmission lines connected to the dam. The 
construction of large pylons and, consequently, heavy equipment driving through the grasslands, had 
led to lung diseases among sheep inhaling the dust this had thrown up according to herders. There were 
also small compensation payments made where the pylons destroyed grasslands. However, it was also 
believed that these transmission lines were taking power to neighbouring counties and prefectures, so 
there were few discernible benefits beyond one-off compensation payments, and a lasting downside in 
loss of land and animal deaths. One commented, 'there are more pylons than livestock now'.  
Opinions about the large, utility-scale solar PV plant were also mixed. Many said it had no impact on 
their lives, positive or negative: they had not grazed the land that was lost nor would they use the 
electricity, which was being exported. However, some still thought it was a poor use of grassland that 
could have been herded and others feared an environmental impact on the grasslands from such a large 
scale installation, perhaps in a long-term warming effect caused by the large concentration of reflective 
panels.  
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4.4 Analysis  
This initial, scoping fieldwork suggests that Guinan is a county that could benefit from SEPAP. It is a poor 
county, and residents could, for example, generate income by selling electricity to the grid from their 
permanent winter homes, since during the summer months, when there is the most sunshine and 
herders are typically out in the pasture, unused electricity would provide an additional income and a 
locally generated electricity source. However, seasonal movements also mean there is a continued need 
for off-grid solar energy sources, which central planners may have overlooked. Moreover, the large-
scale exploitation of solar resources there, in the form of large-scale, ground-mounted PV plants 
connected to demand centres in eastern cities via ultra-high-voltage transmission, may be a net positive 
for the country, but should not be conflated with local development projects such as SEPAP.  
However, these aspects have not been widely considered in academic literature or policy documents, 
as far as we are aware. Nor does the literature on energy, development, environment or wider cultural 
shifts in the region make much use of the sorts of practical observations and findings detailed here. Even 
in detailed assessments of the outlook and utilisation of solar PV in the Tibetan Plateau (cf. Luo and 
Zhang 2012; Wang and Qiu 2009), for example, there is no mention made of how seasonal movements 
may conflict with the appropriateness of year-round grid connection, or whether off-grid approaches 
might therefore present environmental or social benefits. Although herder settlement may create a 
preferable environment for the development of a year-round grid connection, it contradicts the 
seasonal nature of the pastoral production, which is still the main income source of local herders. 
Therefore, how renewable energy and poverty alleviation goals will align with local ecological and socio-
cultural characteristics is an area that deserves more scrutiny. 
Still, there are clues that these phenomena exist in the margins of a few papers, such as a monograph 
by Tsering Bum (Tsering 2016) that describes how the Beijing-headquartered environmental NGO 
Shanshui helped build, 'solar energy powered electric fences to prevent bear break-ins in Drido County 
communities' in Qinghai province, as well as his observations of nomadic uses of an improvised solar 
home system using a broken motorcycle battery, and also the use of solar radios. A review of the REDP 
programme (D’Agostino et al. 2011) also noted that former end-users of the programme said. 'that both 
are necessary, a grid connection for the winter home and an SHS for their nomadic needs. As discussed 
in several of the REDP documents, nomadic herders bring SHS to provide lighting for when they summer 
in the mountains'. 
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5. The Implications for SEPAP 
There are several implications that can be drawn from this study of SEPAP. If it is to realise its ambitious 
goal of helping to eradicate poverty by 2020, it faces some big challenges in its design. These include, 
first, the need for greater finance and dedicated support from banking and market actors. On 9 
December 2016, China Central Television (CCTV), the main state broadcaster, reported that Ningxia’s 
pilot SEPAP projects have experienced significant delays in construction, with only a small fraction of 
projects completed. Even in those counties that did see roof-top panels installed, CCTV reported that 
residents would only receive 300 RMB in additional annual income, according to their contracts with 
the project developers, far less than the 3,000 RMB suggested in the NEA and CPAD joint policy.  
It is clear that Central Government endorsement is not enough to implement SEPAP, without proper 
financial incentives for solar companies and policy banks. Some poor counties may attract companies 
to implement SEPAP by offering the opportunity to develop large scale solar parks there. Yet facing 
severe curtailment, these opportunities may be less tempting, and policy banks (CDB and CADB are 
currently expected to finance the whole 5.16 GW of capacity by themselves, around 120 billion RMB 
according to current market prices) are likely to be cautious about providing upfront financing where 
poor households and villages can provide little collateral for loans and the prospect of returns are 
uncertain. Widespread problems in rural areas with poor grid connections and delayed subsidy 
reimbursements may damage the viability of these projects. No commercial banks would be interested 
due to the risks associated with SEPAP projects.  
Besides financial difficulties, another challenge for SEPAP is the accountability of the programme. Our 
case studies suggest that local households have little information or knowledge about these initiatives 
or their benefits. They are intended to be passive beneficiaries, with little negotiation power with 
project developers, officials, policy banks or grid companies. Monitoring the distribution of the returns 
from SEPAP activities throughout project cycle can be a challenging task. It should also be noted that 
the main regulator of SEPAP is NEA, who do not have direct supervision and authority power over local 
governments, even if they should be able to regulate industrial actors.   
SEPAP is being implemented in the context of a vertically and horizontally fragmented bureaucracy. 
Various interests intersect and interact to affect its likely outcomes. SEPAP originated from a leadership-
level ambition and an alignment of bureaucratic interests between energy and poverty alleviation 
regulators. However, the governance structure of the programme, the policy content, and the field 
investigation suggest that it is the energy regulators that have taken the lead in designing and promoting 
the policy process, and their priority interests, such as reallocating industrial capacity, are higher on the 
agenda.  
The latest announcement, that over 5.16 GW capacity will be installed in the first phase of SEPAP, is 
only an example of such a policy preference. This power imbalance may have a profound impact on the 
implementation and policy outcome. As the regulator for industrial policies and sector development 
that usually focus on supply-side expansion (such as the manufacturing and investment capacities for 
renewable energy facilities, or upgrading grid services) NEA is not experienced or capable of managing 
demand-side dynamics at the local level (such as the actual needs and difficulties of the poor villages 
households, local corruption, land disputes, insufficient local data, and transparent reporting systems) 
which would eventually determine the success of SEPAP as a development rather than industrial project. 
The case study showed that in regions of Qinghai there is great potential for the further expansion of 
clean and reliable energy access in rural and pastoral areas through solar PV, in a likely combination of 
off-grid and grid-connected systems, with particular emphasis on the need for mobility, where herders’ 
livelihoods require seasonal movement, as well as through solar water heating and cleaner cookstoves 
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or cooking and heating fuels, particularly where other poverty alleviation and development 
programmes can help to provide running water and sanitation. There may also be further unexplored 
potential upsides to off-grid solar PV programmes in terms of expanding energy access, mitigating air 
pollution, climate change and negative health effects of fuel burning, as well as improving disaster 
resilience and energy security in China, where grids are otherwise stretched thin over long distances.  
The fact this has been overlooked suggests again the current mismatch between China’s industrial 
policies and its development targets. Solar PV policy in China is still largely dominated by an emphasis 
on supply-side expansion in the form of such things as technology, manufacturing capacity, and wider 
renewable energy policy on the development of large-scale hydropower projects, particularly on the 
Tibetan Plateau. There is less focus on the demand side and, in this case, on poor households and mobile 
herders’ communities. Where poverty alleviation is aligned with renewable energy deployment, the 
early benefits of such schemes as the Brightness Programme have either been largely overlooked as 
emphasis shifts towards grid connection, or poorly implemented due to local protectionism or 
inadequate policy design, as in the case of SEPAP.  
Perhaps a vision of energy services that could serve the needs of the poor and help mitigate climate 
change at the planet’s 'Third Pole' might need to start from a different set of assumptions about 
livelihoods and social-environmental systems in Tibetan regions than SEPAP or similar policies have 
previously taken into account. If it is assumed, for example, that seasonal movements and herding 
constitute a necessarily backward and/or environmentally destructive set of practices – or simply that 
their death is imminent and inevitable, as modernisation is conflated with sedentarisation or 
urbanisation – it becomes harder to see the potential of modern, mobile and decentralised energy 
systems forming part of a dynamic, hybrid model of energy, forming a pillar of conservation in 
threatened ecosystems where nomadic stewardship is a dynamic and important aspect of a threatened 
ecology in a warming climate.   
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6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analysed China’s ambitious political plan of using solar PV technologies to promote 
poverty alleviation. The policy analysis and case study in Qinghai province suggested multiple interests 
at play among state regulators in promoting this initiative, and significant gaps between policy design 
and implementation, particularly with regard to funding, project maintenance and accountability. Since 
most SEPAP activities will not be commercially viable, and local fiscal and technological capacity is 
limited, innovative approaches are needed to make sure policy targets are met by 2020. Policy alliances 
among central regulators without sincere participation from key local, financial, and market 
stakeholders will face challenges at the implementation stages of these top-down initiatives, as these 
non-state actors’ financial and technological resources are indispensable at project level. The lack of 
sufficient upfront capital is a good example of the need to create proper incentives to get policy banks, 
local budgetary departments, and solar corporations into policy networks. In addition, independent 
surveillance programmes that can monitor the accountability of the programme and provide feedback 
to the central policy makers are also necessary. In China’s political context, it would be difficult to 
establish and legitimise these validating schemes, but they are crucial to prevent the top-down political 
ambition being mere rhetoric that does not produce benefits in reality for the targeted populations, as 
has been seen in various Chinese political campaigns in the past. 
The case study also indicates that for most nomadic households that the programme is supposed to 
benefit, the plan to enhance their living standards by selling additional energy via grid connected solar 
systems is not being realised. SEPAP could instead consider local variety and context rather than 
prescribing unified project options from the top. Local communities should be better informed of the 
central government’s intentions, and county and village governments should be permitted greater 
autonomy to select feasible project types that suit their own realities. Prior experience in small 
hydropower can be a role model in this regard, to integrate local knowledge into the SEPAP initiative. 
Finally, the integration of renewable energy technology and poverty alleviation is laudable, but an 
innovative concept, and needs to be further explored through other empirical cases, both within China 
and in other developing countries. Questions around combining industrial policies with development 
goals, and what governance structures or institutions may serve these multiple policy purposes well, 
are excellent research questions for future studies.  
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